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THE  LEGALITY  OF  CLASS  ACTION  WAIVERS  IN
EMPLOYMENT  CONTRACTS
Benjamin M. Redgrave*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a new employee at a large corporation.  As part of your
orientation, you are instructed to sign a number of different documents in
order to formally begin your employment.  Among them is a waiver that says
something like this:
All claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of, or in relation to this
document or Employee’s employment with Company shall be decided by
arbitration. . . . Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, dis-
putes, or controversies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class, collective action, or representative
proceeding.1
Is such a waiver legally enforceable?  And more importantly, should such
a waiver be legally enforceable?  The answer is far from clear, as the recent
and widening circuit split on the issue demonstrates.2  Moreover, the
enforceability (or lack thereof) of these waivers can have an enormous
impact on the relationship between employers and employees as well as the
burden on the court system.
For example, assume such waivers are enforceable.  Every company will
have an incentive to include them in their employment contracts since they
provide companies much more control over any potential litigation—the
company, not the employee, gets to dictate the terms on which any disputes
are to be resolved.3  This would shift the balance of power between employer
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018.  I would like to
acknowledge the helpful input from Professor Barbara Fick, the skillful editing of my
fellow Law Review members, and above all the boundless love and tireless support of my
wife and daughter.
1 This language comes directly from the employment contract at issue in, and quoted
in, Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2016).
2 Compare Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding such
waivers unenforceable), and Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (same),
with Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 776 (holding such waivers enforceable), Murphy Oil
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (same), and Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (same).
3 See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., EPI
BRIEFING PAPER NO. 414, THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES
1841
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and employee in favor of the employer, as it would dissuade employees from
bringing minor suits in which any possible recovery would be outweighed by
the cost of arbitration4 and force employees to bring actions against their
employer through a specific type of legal action (arbitration) that might not
be in their best interest.5  As a result, employees’ ability to hold their employ-
ers accountable for unfair actions could be severely limited, if not completely
obliterated.
Conversely, if such waivers are unenforceable, then employees will be
free to bring collective actions that are likely to be resolved through the court
system.6  Moreover, they may have large incentives to bring such actions: if
each individual employee has only suffered a small amount of harm at the
WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 23 (2015) (discussing advantages employers
gain by including such waivers in their employment contracts and demonstrating how
“[a]rbitration has become an important tool in the corporate arsenal to defend against
legal claims”).  For a brief list of some of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration,
see also Alyesha A. Dotson, The Supreme Court Speaks on Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/labor-employ-
ment/the_supreme_court_speaks_class_action_waivers_arbitration_agreements.html (last
visited Nov. 28, 2016).
4 Take for instance the named employee in Sutherland who claimed that she was enti-
tled to 151.5 hours of unpaid overtime wages ($1867.02 in total). Sutherland, 726 F.3d at
294.  While such a sum was significant to the plaintiff, individual arbitration would have
been far more costly than the amount she could have recovered, a plight shared by her
fellow employees.  Consequently none of the employees had an incentive to bring a claim
as an individual.  Although the Sutherland court ultimately upheld the class-action waiver,
the facts of the case provide an illustrative example of the potential economic obstacles
faced by employees attempting to bring a claim in their individual capacities. See also
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE
GAIN 68 (2000) (“[I]f the loss is small, it is less likely to be recognized by those affected,
and it is less likely that anyone will come forward to claim compensation even if many
individuals . . . are affected by it.”).  This concern is alleviated when Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) claims are brought, since employees will also be awarded attorneys’ fees if they
prevail. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012) (“The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid
by the defendant, and the costs of the action.”).
5 See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 19 (“Employee win rates in mandatory
arbitration are much lower than in either federal court or state court, with employees in
mandatory arbitration winning only just about a fifth of the time (21.4 percent), which is
59 percent as often as in the federal courts and only 38 percent as often as in state courts.
Differences in damages awarded are even greater, with the median or typical award in
mandatory arbitration being only 21 percent of the median award in the federal courts and
43 percent of the median award in the state courts. . . . [Thus,] mandatory arbitration is
massively less favorable to employees than are the courts.”); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 418 (2007) (“Among the 836 employment arbitration awards in the
sample I examined, the employee win rate was 19.7 percent. . . . This employee win rate
is . . . substantially lower than the employee win rates in employment discrimination litiga-
tion of 36.4 percent for federal courts and 43.8 percent for state courts.”).
6 This is not a guarantee, of course, as employees could still choose to sign away their
rights to collective/class action in the absence of management pressure or choose to pro-
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hands of his employer, it may not be worth his time to bring an individual
claim7—and he will be unlikely to find an attorney willing to represent him.8
Both issues are easily resolved once the employees can pool their claims, but
this approach is not without its disadvantages.  By allowing (and potentially
creating an incentive for) employees to bring their claims collectively in
court rather than through individual arbitration the already overtaxed court
system9 might see a rise in class action lawsuits that it is ill-equipped to
handle.10
This Note attempts to bring clarity to this controversy by examining the
two competing statutes at issue—the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)—the Supreme Court’s cases on the
issue, and the arguments for and against such waivers advanced by the Sec-
ond, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, which have all directly
addressed the question.  Part I provides an overview of these two statutes, the
ceed through collective/class arbitration out of court as opposed to collective/class litiga-
tion in court.
7 See supra note 4.
8 Attorneys are unlikely to agree to bring individual claims like that of Stephanie
Sutherland since any contingent recovery will be much less than the cost of litigation (even
if the lawyer had a 50% contingency fee, his recovery could only be $933.51) and individu-
als are unlikely to want to pay an attorney an hourly fee that will quickly exceed their own
recovery. See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 21–22 (“The mandatory arbitration-
litigation outcome gap has a significant and pernicious effect on the ability to obtain legal
counsel under these contingency-fee arrangements. . . . Whereas on average plaintiffs’
attorneys accepted 15.8 percent of potential cases involving employees who could go to
litigation, they accepted about half as many, 8.1 percent, of the potential cases of employ-
ees covered by mandatory arbitration.”).  The same fact that alleviates footnote four’s con-
cern in the FLSA context—the awarding of attorneys’ fees—alleviates this concern in the
FLSA context. See supra note 4.
9 See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering
Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b (“It would take
six new judgeships on the Eastern District [of California] court to bring down the wor-
kload to an average level, according to a 2015 review of courts and their caseloads by the
Judicial Conference, the federal courts’ policy-making organization.”); see also Jacob
Gershman, Federal Judge Says His Overworked Colleagues Bench Close to Burnout, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 12, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/11/12/federal-judge-says-his-over-
worked-colleagues-bench-close-to-burnout/ (“Judges in federal trial courts have for some
time expressed concern about the ever-growing backlog of civil cases.”).
10 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion for a list of the disadvantages of class actions
and arbitration as opposed to individual arbitration.  563 U.S. 333 (2011).  For example,
the Court explained how “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitra-
tion processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dis-
pute. . . . And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the cost
and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.” Id. at 344–45 (first citing 14 Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 249–50 (2009); and then citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  The Court also pointed out that “the
switch from bilateral to class arbitration [or class action] sacrifices the principal advantage
of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment.” Id. at 348.
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agency that administers the NLRA,11 and the evolution of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence on the topic.  Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s
most recent12 cases addressing mandatory class action waivers.  Part III elabo-
rates the current circuit split on the issue, examining the main cases from the
five circuits that have directly addressed the issue.  Finally, Part IV analyzes
the issue in light of the statutes, Supreme Court precedent, the circuit courts’
reasoning, and competing policy arguments, and argues that collective
action13 waivers in employment contracts should be unenforceable.
I. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the enforceability of collective action waivers, it is
important to understand the context that gives rise to the debate in the first
place.  At the heart of the issue are the two aforementioned federal statutes
and the Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of them.  Consequently,
this Part begins by examining the statutes and concludes by giving an over-
view of the Supreme Court’s general arbitration jurisprudence.  It also gives a
brief account of the federal agency responsible for dealing with labor and
employment questions, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), in the
Section describing the NLRA.
A. The Statutes
There are two main statutes—the FAA and the NLRA—that have a
major impact on the legality of class action waivers in employment con-
tracts.14  This Section gives a brief overview of these two statutes, focusing on
their text.
11 The NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and conferred
on it the power to enforce and interpret the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).  The FAA
is a general statute addressed to courts which mandates the enforceability of certain arbi-
tration agreements. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).  Although the language of the latter stat-
ute states that it applies to “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration,” 9 U.S.C. § 2, the Supreme Court has read the statute broadly to be a
“congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”
which includes both public and private arbitration agreements, Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see infra subsection I.A.1; see also
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (“The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989))).
12 “Most recent” here means the most important cases of the last six years, namely
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), and DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
13 While class actions and collective actions are technically distinct forms of litigation,
this Note uses the terms interchangeably, as its focus is on employment contracts that man-
date individual arbitration to the exclusion of all forms of group legal action.
14 As Part IV demonstrates, the extent to which these two statutes apply to class action
waivers and are compatible with each other plays a large role in deciding whether or not
such waivers should be enforceable.
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1. The FAA
The Federal Arbitration Act was initially passed in 1925 in response to a
number of court decisions that had held arbitration agreements unenforce-
able.15  Consequently, its main goal was “to make valid and enforcible agree-
ments for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate
commerce.”16  The statute mandates by its terms that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.17
While it might seem clear, given this language, that the FAA is meant to
apply only to contracts involving transactions in commerce, such as contracts
between companies or between producers and consumers, the Supreme
Court has read the statute more broadly, gradually expanding the statute to
encompass consumers and employees.18  Moreover, despite the fact that the
statute explicitly states that “nothing herein contained shall apply to con-
tracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,”19 the Court has inter-
preted it to only exclude employment contracts that involve transportation
workers.20  As a result, the FAA has come to take on a life of its own, becom-
ing the embodiment of the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments”21 to the exclusion of both state and federal laws.22
15 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1985) (“The House
Report accompanying the Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration
agreement ‘upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs,’ and to overrule the
judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924))); see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2
(“The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. . . . [This] bill
declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a pro-
cedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.”).
16 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1.
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  The last part of this section (“save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”) is known as the saving clause. See,
e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
18 See infra Section I.B; Part II.  For a brief history of the FAA from 1925 to the present,
including some of the Court’s major decisions, see STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 6–10.
19 9 U.S.C. § 1.
20 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the
“nothing herein” exemption in the FAA only applies to transportation workers); cf. Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991); see also infra Section I.B; Part
II.
21 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
22 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (confirming the FAA’s
preemption of the Discover Bank rule); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333 (striking down the Cali-
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2. The NLRA
Ten years after the passage of the FAA, Congress passed the Wagner Act,
better known as the National Labor Relations Act.23  This Act, which was
intended to deal with many of the labor issues affecting a nation stuck in the
rut of a depression,24 addresses a variety of different labor problems includ-
ing unions, union formation and bargaining, and employees’ rights more
generally.25  In the sections most relevant to this Note, the statute states, inter
alia, that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”26 and
that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 [including the right to engage in concerted activities].”27  This
language, although arguably limited to protecting employees’ union rights,28
has been expansively interpreted, most notably in the context of the phrase
“concerted activities,” which is not explicitly defined by the statute.29
For example, in Guernsey-Muskingum Electric Cooperative, Inc. the NLRB
adopted the analysis of the trial examiner who concluded that a formal
organization is not required and that concerted activity exists as long as “the
fornia law embodied in the Discover Bank rule); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344
(5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the FAA trumps the federal NLRA); Sutherland v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that the FAA trumps the
FLSA); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the FAA
trumps the federal FLSA).
23 See The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-
history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
24 See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner introducing the NLRA
bill) (“The bill which I am introducing is designed to clarify and fortify the provisions of
section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and to provide means of administer-
ing them through the legislative establishment of a national labor board with adequate
enforcement powers.”). See generally NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935 (reprt. 1985).
25 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–69 (2012).
26 Id. § 157.
27 Id. § 158.
28 The statute’s multiple references to the right to collective bargaining—as opposed
to other forms of collective action—support this understanding, as does the declaration of
policy section of the statute which states that “[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce . . . by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.” Id. § 151.  There
is also some support for this interpretation in the legislative history. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC.
4230 (1934) (article by Sen. Wagner) (“The new bill forbids any employer to influence any
organization which deals with problems such as wages, grievances, and hours.  They should
be covered by a genuine labor union.”).
29 Neither the definitions section in 29 U.S.C. § 152 nor the rest of the statute defines
this pivotal phrase.
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matter at issue is of moment to [a] group of employees complaining and . . .
that matter is brought to the attention of management by a spokesman . . .
speaking for the benefit of the interested group.”30  Similarly, in Meyers Indus-
tries, Inc. the Board determined that concerted activity “encompasses those
circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to
prepare for group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly
group complaints to the attention of management.”31  Moreover, the Board
recently held that “an individual who files a class or collective action . . .
[clearly] seeks to initiate or induce group action.”32  Thus, the NLRB has
understood the right to concerted activity to include the right to collective
and class action lawsuits.33  And although the NLRA has undergone multiple
amendments since its adoption in 1935,34 the aforementioned provisions
have remained unchanged35 and continue to play an important role in the
ongoing debate over the enforceability of collective action waivers.36
30 124 N.L.R.B. 618, 624 (1959), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec.
Coop., Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960).  The fact that three employees brought the same
complaints was sufficient to establish concerted activity even though all three individually
complained to their supervisor without explicitly agreeing that one of them would be a
spokesman for the others. See id. at 621.  For an in depth summary of much of the NLRB’s
early expansion of the phrase “concerted activities,” see generally Robert A. Gorman &
Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of “Concert” Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981).
31 Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers Industries II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986), aff’d sub nom.
Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
32 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2279 (2012), enforced in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013).
33 See, e.g., id.; see also infra Section III.B.  The Supreme Court has somewhat endorsed
this view insofar as it has held that the protections of the NLRA can be enforced “through
channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.”  Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 556, 565 (1978); see also id. at 565–67 (“The 74th Congress [that passed the
NLRA] knew well enough that labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts other than collec-
tive bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context. . . .
Thus, it has been held that the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause protects employees from
retaliation by their employers when they seek to improve working conditions through
resort to administrative and judicial forums . . . . To hold that activity of this nature is
entirely unprotected—irrespective of location or the means employed—would leave
employees open to retaliation for much legitimate activity that could improve their lot as
employees.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
34 The most notable amendments have been the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which
expanded the number of Board members and reined in the power of unions, and the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, which put even more restrictions on unions. See 1947 Taft-
Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-
history/1947-taft-hartley-passage-and-nlrb-structural-changes (last visited Nov. 29, 2016);
1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1959-lan-
drum-griffin-act (last visited Nov. 29, 2016).
35 Most importantly, the language involving “concerted activity” appears exactly as
quoted in the previous paragraph.
36 For example, both the Seventh Circuit in Lewis v. Epic Systems and the Ninth Circuit
in Morris v. Ernst & Young have used the NLRA to justify their determinations that collec-
tive action waivers are unenforceable. See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979
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The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations Board,37 which
is given the power to “make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the NLRA].”38  This
gives the NLRB broad authority to manage labor affairs, especially the rela-
tionship between employers and employees.39  Indeed, one of the NLRB’s
two main functions is “to prevent employers and unions from engaging in
unfair labor practices.”40  In order to accomplish this function the NLRB has
also been given the power to investigate charges alleging unfair labor prac-
tices and to fashion remedies if the charges are found to be meritorious.41  In
the event that an employer refuses to abide by the NLRB’s remedy, the NLRB
can then petition a U.S. court of appeals for a decree enforcing the NLRB’s
order.42  Moreover, the NLRB has great discretion when interpreting the
NLRA.43  Thus, there are many circumstances in which the meaning of an
NLRA provision takes its guidance from the NLRB’s interpretation of that
provision.44
B. The Supreme Court’s General Arbitration Jurisprudence
Since the passage of the FAA the Supreme Court has had many opportu-
nities to address the contours of the statute but did little to expand its scope
until the 1980s.45  Cases prior to this point tended to interpret the FAA nar-
(9th Cir. 2016) (“In this case, we consider whether an employer violates the National
Labor Relations Act by requiring employees to sign [a collective action waiver] agree-
ment . . . . We conclude that it does.”); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th
Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that this [collective action waiver] agreement violates the
National Labor Relations Act . . . .”).
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).
38 Id. § 156.
39 See, e.g., NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-
TIONS ACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND PROCEDURES OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (rev. ed. 1997).
40 Id. at 33.
41 Id. at 36–37; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 160–61.
42 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
43 See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992) (“[T]he NLRB is entitled
to judicial deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a statute that it adminis-
ters.” (citing NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484
U.S. 112, 123 (1987)).
44 See, e.g., NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) (“[T]he task of
defining the scope of [the NLRA] ‘is for the Board to perform in the first instance as it
considers the wide variety of cases that come before it.’” (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556, 568 (1978))).  For an example of this in action see D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B.
2277 (2012), enforced in part, rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344
(5th Cir. 2013).
45 See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 7 (“[B]etween 1925 and the 1980s, courts
interpreted the FAA as applying to a narrow set of cases . . . . But in the 1980s the U.S.
Supreme Court turned the FAA upside-down through a series of surprising decisions.
These decisions set in motion a major overhaul of the civil justice system.”).
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rowly, and arbitration agreements were struck down for a variety of reasons.46
Then in 1983, the Supreme Court decided Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp., in which it created the now famous language about
how the FAA embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments,” on its way to holding that courts should resolve all doubts “in favor of
arbitration” when it is ambiguous whether a dispute is governed by an arbi-
tration agreement.47  The next year the Court greatly expanded this “liberal
policy” in Southland Corp. v. Keating where it held that not only does the FAA
apply to state courts as well as federal courts, it also preempts state laws that
conflict with the FAA.48  The rapid expansion continued in 1985 when the
Court decided in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. that the
FAA can compel the arbitration of statutory claims as well as contractual
claims.49  Finally, in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior University the Court held that arbitration agreements are to be
enforced “according to their terms,” implying that reasonable restrictions
which arbitration agreements impose should be followed.50
Perhaps the two most important arbitration cases of this era in the
employment context are Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. and Circuit City
Stores v. Adams, as they address the reach of the FAA in relation to mandatory
employment dispute arbitration agreements.51  In Gilmer, a man was
required to register as a securities representative with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) as a condition of his employment.52  Part of his registra-
tion application to the NYSE included a provision which stated, inter alia, that
he “‘agree[d] to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy’ arising between
46 See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (holding that an
arbitration agreement in an employment contract was unenforceable since it did not
involve a maritime transaction or a transaction in commerce); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427
(1953) (holding that an arbitration agreement involving a sale of securities was unenforce-
able on the grounds that the Securities Act of 1933 trumped the FAA), overruled by Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbi-
tration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644–60 (1996) (tracing the limitations of pre-1980s FAA
caselaw).
47 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 (1983).
48 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 16 (1984).
49 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625, 627
(1985).
50 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989).
51 While these are the most important arbitration cases involving employees in their
individual capacities, another line of cases has addressed the issue of arbitration with
regards to unions. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding
that a mandatory arbitration clause in a union’s collective bargaining agreement did not
preclude union members from bringing section 1983 claims in court); Barrentine v. Arkan-
sas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding the same with regards to FLSA
claims); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding the same with
regards to Title VII claims).
52 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
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him and [his company]” that his company required to be arbitrated.53  In
enforcing this waiver, the Supreme Court held that “it is . . . clear that statu-
tory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pur-
suant to the FAA,” and that a valid contract that requires arbitration must be
enforced according to its terms “unless Congress itself has evinced an inten-
tion to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.”54  The Court also noted that the case only tangentially addressed waiv-
ers in the employment context, however, insofar as the relevant contract was
between the plaintiff and the NYSE, not the plaintiff and his employer.55
The Court in Adams directly addressed this fact, holding that even
though Gilmer did not involve an employment contract, its holding was at
least potentially valid in the employment context.56  In Adams, Circuit City
employees were required to sign an arbitration agreement that stated that
“[employees] agree that [they] will settle any and all . . . claims, disputes or
controversies arising out of . . . [their] employment and/or cessation of
employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration.”57
Finding this arbitration agreement to be enforceable, the Court concluded
that the only employment contracts that are categorically excluded from the
FAA are contracts involving transportation workers.58  Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that the FAA’s reach is broad enough to govern arbitration
agreements in the employment context as well as the company-company con-
text, and that such agreements are enforceable even when statutory claims
are at issue.
II. MODERN SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s recent twenty-first-century jurisprudence contin-
ues the trend of interpreting the FAA more and more expansively, overruling
legislative and judicial attempts to limit its reach.59  To illustrate this fact, the
next Section gives an account of the most significant Court cases (in terms of
mandatory arbitration waivers) of the last five years in chronological order.
A. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Not only is AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion60 perhaps the most impor-
tant Court case to address mandatory arbitration waivers like the one
53 Id.
54 Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
55 See id. at 25 n.2 (“[T]he arbitration clause being enforced here is not contained in a
contract of employment.”).
56 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001).
57 Id. at 109–10 (quoting the arbitration agreement).
58 Id. at 119.
59 See supra Section I.B.
60 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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described in the opening paragraph,61 it is also one of the most cited recent
Supreme Court cases generally.62  In Concepcion the Supreme Court was
faced with the question of whether the FAA trumps state laws that prohibit
companies from forcing their consumers into individual arbitration.63  Spe-
cifically, as part of their cellphone contract with AT&T the Concepcions
agreed to a waiver provision that mandated that “all disputes between the
[Concepcions and AT&T] . . . be brought in the [Concepcions’] ‘individual
capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or
representative proceeding.’”64  Four years later, the Concepcions filed a law-
suit against AT&T that was consolidated with a pending class action, and the
company moved to enforce the waiver provision.65  Relying on the California
Supreme Court’s common law holding in Discover Bank v. Superior Court that
class action waivers in consumer adhesion contracts are unenforceable,66 the
district court refused to enforce the waiver and denied AT&T’s motion.67
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Discover Bank rule was
not preempted by the FAA.68
After laying out the Discover Bank rule, the Supreme Court came to the
exact opposite conclusion, opining that “nothing in [the FAA] suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the FAA’s objectives.”69  Finding that “[t]he ‘principal purpose’ of
the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms,’”70 and that the Discover Bank rule precludes this by
preventing companies from enforcing agreements which mandate individual
arbitration,71 the Court held that the Discover Bank rule was preempted by
61 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s five-to-four
decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion is proving to be a tsunami that is wiping out
existing and potential consumer and employment class actions.”).
62 As of March 5, 2017, the Westlaw page for Concepcion lists over 10,000 citing refer-
ences.  By way of comparison, other highly recognizable twenty-first-century Court cases
such as District of Columbia v. Heller (7853), National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius (5079), Bush v. Gore (4995), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (8247)
have far fewer references.  Even Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan-
sas, perhaps the most famous case of the twentieth century, only has 22,939 citing refer-
ences, despite being decided over half a century ago (rather than half a decade ago).
63 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
67 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337–38.
68 Id. at 338; see also Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 2009),
rev’d, Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
69 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
70 Id. at 344 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
71 Id. (“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental
attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”).
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the FAA.72  As further support for this decision the Court pointed out how
the main advantages of arbitration such as informality, lower costs, greater
efficiency, and the ability to choose adjudicators best matched to the dispute
are lost when collective actions—including class arbitration—are allowed.73
It also pointed out how class arbitration was “not even envisioned by Con-
gress when it passed the FAA in 1925,” and that “class arbitration greatly
increases risks to defendants.”74  Finally, the Court found that the arbitration
agreement was actually quite generous to the Concepcions and would likely
afford them a better outcome than any form of collective action.75  In accord
with this conclusion, the Court proceeded to reverse the Ninth Circuit,
explicitly overrule Discover Bank, and remand for consistent proceedings.76
B. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant
In the Supreme Court’s follow-up case to Concepcion, American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court was again confronted with the question
of “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act.”77  In Italian Colors, a group of merchants who
accepted American Express credit cards filed a class action lawsuit against the
company even though they had signed arbitration agreements that included
a waiver of the right to class actions.78  The district court swiftly granted
American Express’s motion to compel individual arbitration in accord with
this contract, but was reversed by the Second Circuit, which found that Con-
cepcion did not apply.79
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and affirmed
the trial court, holding that the FAA dictates that arbitration agreements be
enforced according to their terms even when it would not be feasible80 for a
72 Id. at 352 (“California’s Discover Bank rule is pre-empted by the FAA.”).
73 See id. at 350.
74 Id. at 349–50.
75 Id. at 352 (“Indeed, [even] the District Court concluded that the Concepcions were
better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as par-
ticipants in a class action.”).
76 Id.  On remand the District Court granted AT&T’s motion to compel individual
arbitration. See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., Nos. 06cv675, 05cv1167, 2012 WL 1681762
(S.D. Cal. May 9, 2012).
77 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2307 (2013).
78 This agreement provided, inter alia, that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for
any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” Id. at 2308 (quoting In re Am. Express
Merchs.’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2304).
79 Id.  The procedural history is actually slightly more complicated than this as it
involves the Supreme Court reversing the Second Circuit’s decision in 2010, the Second
Circuit reaffirming its decision on remand in 2011 (twice), and a second appeal to the
Supreme Court, which generated the 2013 decision.
80 The plaintiffs argued that it would not be feasible to bring individual claims on the
basis of an economist’s opinion that it would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to
prove their claims while the maximum recovery for each individual plaintiff would only be
$12,850. Id.
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plaintiff to bring a claim through individual arbitration.81  To justify this
holding the Court began by laying out the text of the FAA and reiterating
that the FAA predominates unless it has been “overridden by a contrary con-
gressional command.”82  It then found that the Sherman Act, under which
the merchants’ claims were brought, did not include any such contrary com-
mand.83  Moreover, the Court found that Rule 23 did not establish a right to
class actions84 and that preventing the merchants from participating in a
class action lawsuit did not eliminate the merchants’ ability to bring claims
under the Sherman Act—it merely prevented them from using that particu-
lar form of action to bring such claims.85  Finally, the Court explicitly
rejected the effective vindication doctrine, stating that “[its] decision in
AT&T Mobility all but resolves [the issue],” since that case “specifically
rejected the argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims
‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”86
C. DIRECTV v. Imburgia
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia is the Supreme Court’s most recent attempt to
address class action waivers.87  In DIRECTV, a service contract between
DIRECTV and its customers included a provision that stated that “any claim
either [party] asserts will be resolved only by binding arbitration,” and that
“[n]either [party] shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in arbitra-
tion.”88  The contract also included a provision that stated that “if the ‘law of
[the customer’s] state’ makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable,
then the entire arbitration provision is ‘unenforceable.’”89  When two cus-
tomers brought a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV in California state
court, the company moved to enforce the contract and send the matter to
arbitration.90  After the state trial court denied the motion, the California
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the Discover Bank rule was still good
law in California, even if it was trumped by the FAA in federal litigation, and
that consequently Concepcion did not apply.91
On direct review from the California Court of Appeal,92 the Supreme
Court held that the court of appeal’s interpretation of Concepcion was invalid
81 Id. at 2312, 2312 n.5 (“[T]he FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”).
82 Id. at 2309 (quoting CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012)).
83 Id.
84 Id. (“[C]ongressional approval of Rule 23 [does not] establish an entitlement to
class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights.”).
85 Id. at 2310–11.
86 Id. at 2312 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
87 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015).
88 Id. (quoting the contract).
89 Id. (quoting the contract).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 466–67.
92 After the California Supreme Court refused to review the court of appeal’s ruling,
DIRECTV petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 467.
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and that the arbitration agreement should be enforced according to its
terms.93  In coming to this conclusion the Court began by reminding the
court of appeal that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to follow Concep-
cion’s interpretation of the FAA.94  It then proceeded to opine that “[a]bsent
any indication in the contract that [the language about the law of the state] is
meant to refer to invalid state law, [the language] presumably takes its ordi-
nary meaning: valid state law.”95  Summarily dismissing the court of appeal’s
attempt to maintain the validity of Discover Bank,96 the Court held that the
“law of the state,” for purposes of the contract at issue, was the FAA since the
FAA had preempted California law.97  Thus the Court continued its trend of
reading the FAA expansively and reiterated its opinion that the FAA
preempts state laws that try to make mandatory class action waivers
unenforceable.98
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
In order to give an effective account of this hotly contested issue99 it is
also important to understand what the different circuit courts have said the
law is and the way in which they each came to their decisions.  Consequently,
this Part lays out the reasoning and holdings of the five circuit courts that
have addressed collective action waivers in employment arbitration agree-
ments.  Section III.A will examine decisions of the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits that have held waivers of the right to collective action in employment
contracts to be unenforceable,100 while Section III.B will examine decisions
of the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits that have held such waivers to be
enforceable.101
93 Id. at 471.
94 Id. at 468.
95 Id. at 469.
96 Id. at 470 (“The view that state law retains independent force even after it has been
authoritatively invalidated by this Court is one courts are unlikely to accept.”).
97 Id. at 471.
98 Id.
99 See supra note 2; see also Todd D. Wozniak & Jack S. Gearan, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Widens Circuit Split as to Class Action Waivers in Employee Arbitration Agreements, NAT’L
L. REV. (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ninth-circuit-court-appeals-
widens-circuit-split-to-class-action-waivers-employee.
100 See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys.
Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016); infra subsections III.A.1; III.A.2.
101 See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016); Murphy Oil
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344
(5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (per
curiam); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013); infra subsections III.B.1;
III.B.2; III.B.3.
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A. Waivers Are Unenforceable
1. The Seventh Circuit: Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp.
In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., the Seventh Circuit was presented with the
question of whether an employer could legally require its employees to waive
their right to class action litigation as a condition for continuing employ-
ment.102  Specifically, the employer, Epic Systems Corporation (“Epic”), sent
an email to its employees that contained an arbitration agreement mandat-
ing that the employees waive “the right to participate in or receive money or
any other relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding,” and
that employees were “deemed to have accepted [the] Agreement” if they
“continue[d] to work at Epic.”103  One of the employees who received and
accepted the terms of this email later sued Epic, claiming the arbitration
agreement violated federal law.104
The Seventh Circuit held the agreement was unenforceable, noting that
it “violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)” and is thus “unenforce-
able under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”105  To support its holding the
court began by examining the text of the NLRA and the legal precedent
interpreting it.106  In doing so, the court found that “the Board has, ‘from its
earliest days,’ held that ‘employer-imposed, individual agreements that pur-
port to restrict Section 7 rights’ are unenforceable” and that one such right is
the right to engage in concerted activities.107  The court then proceeded to
hold that “concerted activity” for purposes of the NLRA includes the right to
collective and class legal action, finding support both in the statute itself108
and in the NLRB’s interpretation of the statute.109
In light of this definition, the court found that Epic had clearly violated
section 7 of the NLRA by prohibiting all forms of collective legal action and
that the contract was consequently unenforceable since “[c]ontracts that stip-
ulate away employees’ Section 7 rights or otherwise require actions unlawful
under the NLRA are unenforceable.”110  The court then turned to Epic’s
argument that the FAA overrides the NLRA and makes the agreement
102 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151.
103 Id. (quoting the email sent to Epic’s employees).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1151–52.
107 Id. at 1152 (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2280 (2012), enforced in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013)).
108 Id. at 1153 (“The NLRA’s history and purpose confirm that the phrase ‘concerted
activities’ in Section 7 should be read broadly to include resort to representative, joint,
collective, or class legal remedies.”).
109 Id. (“[T]he Board, in accordance with the reasoning above, has interpreted Sec-
tions 7 and 8 to prohibit employers from making agreements with individual employees
barring access to class or collective remedies.” (citing D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2280)).
110 Id. at 1155 (first citing Nat’l Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 361 (1940); and
then citing D.R. Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2280).
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enforceable in spite of its unenforceability under the NLRA.111  In rejecting
this argument, the court pointed to the fact that in order for the FAA to
trump the NLRA the two statutes would first have to clash.112  Since the
agreement is unlawful under the NLRA, however, it meets the criteria of the
FAA’s saving clause for nonenforcement,113 and there is no conflict between
the statutes.114
The court also distinguished Concepcion and Italian Colors, explaining
that those cases were fundamentally about encouraging arbitration as a judi-
cial remedy, whereas sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA are about employees’
rights to engage in concerted activity.115  Consequently, since the court
rejected the argument that the FAA should trump anything that makes arbi-
tration less attractive, including statutory rights, it also rejected the argument
that those cases apply to the nonexistent clash between the FAA and the
NLRA.116  Moreover, the court held that since the NLRA is actually pro-arbi-
tration, to suggest that one of its provisions runs contrary to the Supreme
Court’s command to favor arbitration is nonsensical.117  The court, quoting
Italian Colors, also pointed out that “[a]rbitration agreements that act as a
‘prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies’—that is, of a
substantive right—are not enforceable.”118  And since the court found the
right to concerted activity to be a substantive right, not just a procedural
one,119 it followed that Italian Colors’ own reasoning supported the holding
that the agreement was unenforceable because it required a waiver of a sub-
stantive right.120  Thus the court concluded that the mandatory waiver agree-
ment in Epic’s employment agreement was unenforceable.121
2. The Ninth Circuit: Morris v. Ernst & Young
Not only did the Ninth Circuit in Morris v. Ernst & Young reach the same
basic conclusion as the Seventh Circuit (that employers cannot require their
111 Id. at 1156.  This is the same argument advanced by the circuits that have held
collective action waivers in employment contracts to be enforceable. See infra Section III.B.
112 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
113 Illegality is one of the grounds for unenforceability under the saving clause since it
is a ground on which a contract may be invoked. See supra note 17.
114 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
115 Id. at 1157–59.
116 Id. at 1158.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1160 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310
(2013)).
119 See id. (“The right to collective action in section 7 of the NLRA . . . lies at the heart
of the restructuring of employer/employee relationships that Congress meant to achieve
in the statute. . . . That Section 7’s rights are ‘substantive’ is plain from the structure of the
NLRA: Section 7 is the NLRA’s only substantive provision.  Every other provision of the
statute serves to enforce the rights Section 7 protects.”).
120 Id. at 1160–61.
121 Id. at 1161.
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employees to waive their right to collective action),122 it did so via very simi-
lar reasoning.  In Morris, employees of Ernst & Young “were required to sign
agreements not to join with other employees in bringing legal claims against
the company.”123  Despite this, two employees brought a class action lawsuit
against the company.  After the district court dismissed the lawsuit and
ordered arbitration in accord with the employment agreement, the employ-
ees appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that the agreement violated fed-
eral labor laws.124
In reversing the district court’s decision, the circuit court began by opin-
ing that “[c]oncerted activity—the right of employees to act together—is the
essential, substantive right established by the NLRA.”125  It then referenced
the NLRB’s assessment that “an employer violates the NLRA ‘when it
requires employees covered by the Act . . . to sign an agreement that pre-
cludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims.’”126  Assessing the
Board’s reasoning under the Chevron doctrine,127 the court found that the
agency’s interpretation of the organic statute was consistent with the intent
of Congress and that a plain reading of the statute prohibits an employer
from requiring employees to waive their right to collective action.128
The Morris court, like the court in Lewis, then went on to find that “[t]he
Federal Arbitration Act . . . does not dictate a contrary result.”129  Under its
examination of the FAA, the court found that although the Act requires arbi-
tration contracts to be placed on equal footing with all other contracts, not
all contract terms receive blanket enforcement under the FAA.130  Moreover,
the court held that standard contract defenses apply and that one of these
defenses, illegality, was implicated by the fact that “the contract term defeats
a substantive federal right [under the NLRA] to pursue concerted work-
related legal claims.”131  Even more importantly, the court held that since
the right to collective action at issue here was a “substantive right,”132 the
122 See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he right to
concerted employee activity [such as collective legal action] cannot be waived in an arbitra-
tion agreement.”).
123 Id. at 979.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 980 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).
126 Id. (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2277 (2012), enforced in part, rev’d
in part sub nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013)).
127 For an explanation of the Chevron doctrine see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 560–79 (7th ed. 2016).
128 Morris, 834 F.3d at 981–84 (“In sum, the Board’s interpretation of § 7 and § 8 is
correct.  Section 7’s ‘mutual aid or protection clause’ includes the substantive right to col-
lectively ‘seek to improve working conditions . . .’ [and] [u]nder § 8, an employer may not
defeat the right by requiring employees to pursue all work-related legal claims individu-
ally.” (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978))).
129 Id. at 984.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 985.
132 Id. at 986 (“The rights established in § 7 of the NLRA—including the right of
employees to pursue legal claims together—are substantive.  They are the central, funda-
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FAA did not mandate the enforcement of the contract term limiting this
right.133
In response to the dissent’s argument that the FAA trumps the NLRA
and should therefore predominate, the court employed the same reasoning
as the Seventh Circuit and found that there is no need to consider whether
the NLRA trumps the FAA (or vice versa) since they are capable of co-
existing.134  The court also disagreed with the dissent’s reading of Supreme
Court precedent135 and maintained that “the Supreme Court has repeatedly
made clear [that] there is a limiting principle built into the FAA on what may
be waived in arbitration: where substantive rights are at issue, the FAA’s sav-
ing clause works in conjunction with the other statute to prevent conflict.”136
Thus the court concluded that “[i]rrespective of the forum in which disputes
are resolved, employees must be able to act in the forum together,” and that
“[a]n employer may not condition employment on the requirement that an
employee sign [a contract waiving this substantive right].”137
B. Waivers Are Enforceable
1. The Second Circuit: Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP; Patterson v.
Raymours Furniture Co.
Unlike the courts in Morris and Lewis, the Second Circuit in Sutherland v.
Ernst & Young found that employees may legally waive their right to collective
action.138  In Sutherland, Stephanie Sutherland, one of Ernst & Young’s
employees, brought a collective action lawsuit against the company in order
to recover overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act despite
the fact that she had signed an arbitration agreement waiving her right to
mental protections of the Act . . . . Without § 7, the Act’s entire structure and policy
flounder.”).
133 Id. (“[W]hen an arbitration contract professes the waiver of a substantive federal
right, the FAA’s saving clause prevents a conflict between the statutes by causing the FAA’s
enforcement mandate to yield. . . . There is no doubt that Congress intended for § 7 and
its right to ‘concerted activities’ to be the ‘primary substantive provision’ of the NLRA.  For
this reason, the right to concerted employee activity cannot be waived in an arbitration
agreement.” (citations omitted) (first citing Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1159
(7th Cir. 2016); and then citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24
(1991))).
134 Id. at 987.
135 For example, in dismissing Concepcion and Italian Colors the court determined that
those cases were about the adequacy of arbitration as a legal remedy—i.e., the right to
arbitration generally—whereas the NLRA’s prohibition on class action waivers is about the
right to a specific type of arbitration—i.e., collective arbitration—in a specific situation—i.e.,
employment contracts. See id. at 989 (“At its heart, this is a labor law case, not an arbitra-
tion case.”).  The court also further distinguished Concepcion by pointing out that it
involved a consumer arbitration contract rather than a labor arbitration contract. See id. at
987–89.
136 Id. at 988.
137 Id. at 989–90.
138 See Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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class action as part of her employment.139  In dismissing the lawsuit and
sending the parties to arbitration in accord with the agreement, the court
began by discussing the FAA and the Supreme Court’s command that courts
should “rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms,
including terms that specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their
disputes, and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted,”140
unless the FAA has been overridden by a “contrary congressional com-
mand.”141  The court then proceeded to examine the FLSA for such a con-
gressional command but concluded that it did not include one.142
In addition, the court found that since the FLSA requires employees to
opt into class actions, it follows that they should also be able to waive their
right to them.143  And since both Concepcion and Italian Colors upheld class
arbitration waivers, the court concluded that Ernst & Young’s waiver should
similarly be upheld.144  The court then proceeded to address Sutherland’s
alternative argument that her rights could not be effectively vindicated in an
individual action because the result of a victory would be vastly outweighed
by the costs necessary to obtain it.145  In doing so, it determined that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors instructed that “the ‘effective vindi-
cation doctrine’ cannot be used to invalidate class-action waiver provisions in
circumstances where the recovery sought is exceeded by the costs of individ-
ual arbitration” and that consequently Sutherland’s claim failed.146
The court also (somewhat) addressed in a footnote the argument relied
upon by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits147 that the NLRA prohibits waivers
of collective actions.148  In doing so, the court stated that D.R. Horton (which
held that a waiver of the right to pursue a FLSA claim collectively was unen-
forceable under the NLRA149) was decided by the NLRB without a proper
quorum and that it did not address the specific type of class waiver presented
in Sutherland.150  Moreover, the court held that even if D. R. Horton was appli-
cable, it did not owe any deference to the NLRB’s judgment, and that the
139 Id. at 292, 293–94.  The agreement that the employee signed explicitly stated that,
among other things, “[c]overed Disputes [including claims based on federal statutes such
as the FLSA] pertaining to different [e]mployees will be heard in separate proceedings.”
Id. at 294 (alterations in original).
140 Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013)).
141 Id. at 295 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012)).
142 Id. at 296 (“[T]he text of the FLSA does not ‘evinc[e] an intention to preclude a
waiver of class-action procedure.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct.
at 2309 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
143 Id. at 296–97.
144 Id. at 297.
145 See id. at 298.
146 Id. at 298–99.
147 Since Sutherland predates both Lewis and Morris, the court did not address either
case specifically.
148 See Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 n.8.
149 See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012).
150 Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 297 n.8.
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NLRA was irrelevant to its decision.151  Thus the court held that the waiver in
Sutherland’s employment contract was legally enforceable and moved to
compel individual arbitration pursuant to the FAA accordingly.152
In its most recent case addressing the issue, Patterson v. Raymours Furni-
ture Co., the Second Circuit was again presented with a situation in which a
group of employees sought to bring a collective action lawsuit that was pro-
hibited by a mandatory arbitration agreement in their employment con-
tracts.153  Noting that the arguments advanced by the Seventh Circuit in
Lewis and the Ninth Circuit in Morris were quite persuasive,154 the court
nonetheless held that it was bound by its prior precedent in Sutherland.155
Consequently, it reaffirmed its conclusion that collective action waivers in
employment contracts are legally enforceable.156
2. The Fifth Circuit: D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v.
NLRB
In D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB—the Fifth Circuit’s evaluation of the
NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton157—the court held that the Board’s decision
gave too little weight to the FAA and that the arbitration agreement which
the Board found to be unenforceable158 was instead enforceable.159  To sup-
port this holding, the court began by dismissing the argument that the
Board’s decision was invalid on account of the fact that one of the deciding
151 Id.
152 Id. at 299.
153 See Patterson v. Raymours Furniture Co., 659 F. App’x 40 (2d Cir. 2016), petition for
cert. filed, No. 16-388 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2016).  This arbitration agreement stated, inter alia,
that “[c]laims under this [Employment Arbitration] Program cannot be litigated by way of
class or collective action.  Nor may Claims be arbitrated by way of a class or collective
action.” Id. at 41 n.1.
154 Id. at 43 (“If we were writing on a clean slate we might well be persuaded, for the
reasons forcefully stated in . . . Lewis and Morris, to join the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits . . . .”).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  To distinguish the NLRB decision from
the Fifth Circuit decision, future short cites to the NLRB decision will be cited as “D.R.
Horton” while short cites to the Fifth Circuit decision will be cited as “Horton.”
158 This arbitration agreement, which all of Horton’s employees were required to sign
as a condition of their employment, stated that, among other things:
Horton and its employees agreed that “all disputes and claims” would “be deter-
mined exclusively by final and binding arbitration . . .” [and] that “the arbitrator
[would] not have the authority to consolidate the claims of other employees” and
would “not have the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective
action.”
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting the arbitration agreement).  Consequently, all employment-related disputes
were required to be resolved through individual arbitration.
159 Id.
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Board members was improperly appointed.160  It similarly rejected argu-
ments that the appointment expired before the judgment was passed and
that a judgment by a three-person Board was invalid.161
The court then turned to the Board’s conclusion that Horton had vio-
lated sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.162  Although the court gave some
deference to the Board,163 it also found that the Board failed to account for
the FAA.164  Characterizing class actions as a procedural right, not a substan-
tive right,165 the court pointed out that multiple courts have determined that
there is no right to class procedures under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) and the FLSA.166  Moreover, the court emphasized
that “under the FAA . . . arbitration agreements must be enforced according
to their terms,” with two exceptions: when the FAA’s saving clause applies,167
or when a contrary congressional command is present.168  In determining
that the first exception did not apply, the court found support in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion.169  Arguing that the Board’s deci-
sion would have the effect of disfavoring arbitration, the exact problem for
which the California judicial rule170 at issue in Concepcion was struck down,
the court held that “[r]equiring a class mechanism . . . violates the FAA” and
that “[t]he saving clause is not a basis for invalidating the waiver of class pro-
cedures in the arbitration agreement.”171
The court next addressed the second exception and found that “[t]here
is no argument that the NLRA’s text contains explicit language of a congres-
sional intent to override the FAA.”172  The court also determined that the
legislative history did not contain such an intent and that no such intent
160 Id. at 350–51.  In an attempt to avoid the issue the court flat out declared that it was
“leav[ing] the constitutional issue for the Supreme Court.” Id. at 351.
161 See id. at 352–54.
162 Id. at 355.
163 See id. at 356.
164 See id. at 357.
165 Id. (“The use of class action procedures, though, is not a substantive right. . . .
[Rather] [t]his court . . . has characterized a class action as ‘a procedural device.’” (quot-
ing Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643 (5th Cir. 2012), abrogated by 133 S. Ct.
2064 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
166 Id.
167 See supra note 17.
168 Horton, 737 F.3d at 358.
169 Id. at 359 (“A detailed analysis of Concepcion leads to the conclusion that the Board’s
rule does not fit within the FAA’s saving clause.”).
170 Known as the Discover Bank rule after the California Supreme Court case creating it,
this rule prohibited class action waivers in certain circumstances. See Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (“[T]he law in California is that class
action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are unenforceable, whether the con-
sumer is being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to classwide
arbitration.”), abrogated by Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333.
171 Horton, 737 F.3d at 359–60.
172 Id. at 360.
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could be found in an “inherent conflict” between the NLRA and the FAA.173
In light of the fact that it did not find either exception to the FAA’s mandate
applicable, the court then held that the FAA precluded the NLRB’s decision
and that the arbitration agreement was legally enforceable according to its
terms.174
Two years later the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue again in Murphy Oil
USA, Inc. v. NLRB and reaffirmed its belief that waivers of the right to collec-
tive action in employment contracts are enforceable.175  In Murphy Oil, four
Murphy Oil employees brought a collective action against the company in
federal court in defiance of the arbitration agreement they had signed,176 as
well as an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.177  In the action
before the NLRB, the Board held that the agreement was unlawful, employ-
ing the same reasoning it used in D.R. Horton, and disregarding the Fifth
Circuit’s intervening decision in Horton.178  Although the court held Murphy
Oil’s initial arbitration agreement to be unenforceable on other grounds,179
it refused to reevaluate its decision in Horton and held that the revised arbi-
tration agreement was enforceable according to its terms, while simultane-
ously cautioning the NLRB against disregarding its decisions in the future.180
3. The Eighth Circuit: Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.; Cellular Sales of Missouri,
LLC v. NLRB
Like the Second Circuit in Sutherland and the Fifth Circuit in Horton, the
Eighth Circuit in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc. held that class action waivers in
employment contracts are enforceable.181  In Owen, one of Bristol Care’s
employees, who had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement (MAA) as
173 Id. at 361.  Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in Gil-
mer, the court found that there were major problems with the theory that the NLRA was in
conflict with the FAA but did not go on to try to synthesize them like the courts in Lewis
and Morris. Id.
174 Id. at 362 (“Because the Board’s interpretation does not fall within the FAA’s ‘saving
clause,’ and because the NLRA does not contain a congressional command exempting the
statute from application of the FAA, the Mutual Arbitration Agreement must be enforced
according to its terms.”).
175 See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
176 Id. at 1015.  This agreement stated that “[Murphy Oil] and Individual agree to
resolve any and all disputes or claims . . . which relate . . . to Individual’s employment . . .
by binding arbitration,” and that employees waived the right to pursue class or collective
claims in an arbitral or judicial forum. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the arbitration
agreement).
177 Id. at 1016.
178 Id. at 1017.
179 Specifically, the court rejected the language of this agreement for being too broad
and potentially eliminating employees’ rights to file unfair labor charges with the NLRB.
Id. at 1019.
180 Id. at 1015, 1021 (“[T]he Board will not be surprised that we adhere, as we must, to
our prior ruling. . . . [And] might want to strike a more respectful balance between its
views and those of circuit courts reviewing its orders.”).
181 See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
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part of her employment,182 brought a class action suit against the company
alleging violations of the FLSA.183  In reversing the district court’s decision to
invalidate the agreement, the court began by determining, on the basis of
Supreme Court precedent, that the FAA trumps all other statutes with
regards to arbitration unless there is a contrary congressional command in
those statutes.184  Searching the FLSA for such a command and not finding
one,185 the court, like the court in Sutherland, then opined that since the
FLSA requires employees to opt into class actions, it follows that they should
also be able to waive their right to them.186  Moreover, the court dismissed
the NLRB’s decision in D.R. Horton, holding that it did not apply to the facts
presented in Owen, and that the court would not defer to the NLRB’s reason-
ing even if it did apply.187  Thus, the court concluded that “the class waiver in
the MAA is enforceable” and directed the district court to compel
arbitration.188
In a more recent decision, Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC v. NLRB, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue again when a Cellular Sales employee filed
a class action lawsuit against the company for violating the FLSA.189  Just as
the Fifth Circuit in Murphy Oil affirmed its earlier holding in Horton, so too
did the Eighth Circuit affirm its earlier holding in Owen.190  Citing Murphy
Oil and Owen, the court held that the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA—
that it prohibits mandatory agreements that require individual arbitration of
work-related claims—was incorrect191 and that “Cellular Sales did not violate
[the NLRA] by requiring its employees to enter into an arbitration agree-
182 This arbitration agreement contained a waiver that prohibited the parties “from
arbitrating claims subject to [the] Agreement as, or on behalf of, a class.” Id. at 1051
(alteration in original) (quoting the arbitration agreement).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1052.
185 Id. (“Owen identifies nothing in either the text or legislative history of the FLSA
that indicates a congressional intent to bar employees from agreeing to arbitrate FLSA
claims individually, nor is there an ‘inherent conflict’ between the FLSA and the FAA.”).
186 Id. at 1052–53 (“[I]f an employee must affirmatively opt in to any such class action,
surely the employee has the power to waive participation in a class action as well.”).
187 Id. at 1053–54.
188 Id. at 1055.
189 See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016).  Like the
employees in all of the other cases discussed in Part III, the employee in Cellular Sales had
signed a mandatory arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment.  This agree-
ment stipulated that “Employee hereby agrees to arbitrate any such claims, disputes, or
controversies only in an individual capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
purported class, collective action, or representative proceeding.” Id. at 774 (quoting the
arbitration agreement).
190 Id. at 776.  The similarities between Cellular Sales and Murphy Oil do not stop there,
for in both cases the courts did find that the arbitration agreements were partially flawed
insofar as they potentially restrained employees’ rights to file unfair labor practice charges.
See id. at 777–78; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
191 Cellular Sales, 824 F.3d at 776.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 24  4-MAY-17 9:32
1864 notre dame law review [vol. 92:4
ment that included a waiver of class or collective actions in all forums to
resolve employment-related disputes.”192
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Current State of the Law
While it might be tempting to believe that the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence resolves the issue in favor of enforcing collective action waivers
in employment contracts,193 the aforementioned circuit split undermines
such a conclusion.194  Nonetheless, a few inferences can be discerned from
the tea leaves of these judicial opinions.  First, the Supreme Court in Concep-
cion and DIRECTV made it very clear that it intends to interpret the FAA
expansively and that the FAA’s reach is not limited by state laws that attempt
to stand in its way.195 Italian Colors also makes clear that a plaintiff’s inability
to bring a claim absent a collective action does not prevent mandatory waiv-
ers from being enforceable.196  Moreover, Gilmer and Adams make clear that
employment agreements that do not involve transportation workers are not
categorically exempt from the reach of the FAA.197
In addition, all of the circuits agree that, given this Supreme Court pre-
cedent, the FAA is entitled to some level of deference.  For example, both the
Seventh Circuit in Lewis and the Ninth Circuit in Morris conceded the fact
that the FAA imposes a “federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”198
Likewise, the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have all relied on this exact
same language to arrive at their respective holdings.199  The circuits disagree,
however, as to just how much deference the FAA is owed.  The Seventh Cir-
cuit, which arguably gives the FAA the least deference, believes that the
NLRA is the more relevant federal statute in the employment context and
that the FAA does not extend so far as to trump employees’ statutory
rights.200  The Ninth Circuit similarly limits its deference to the FAA when
192 Id.
193 See supra Part II.
194 See supra Part III, especially Section III.A.  The fact that not one, but two, circuits
(the Seventh and Ninth) have held such waivers to be unenforceable demonstrates that
even if the Court’s jurisprudence should resolve the issue, it certainly has not done so in
practice.
195 See supra Sections II.A; II.C.
196 See supra Section II.B.
197 See supra Section I.B.
198 Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 991 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346 (2011)); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d
1147, 1159 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346).
199 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. at 346); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2013)
(per curiam) (quoting CompuCredit Corp v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012)); Owen v.
Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at
98).
200 See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157–58.
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substantive rights are involved and does not believe that contract terms must
automatically be enforced just because they are in an arbitration agree-
ment.201  Conversely, the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits all value the FAA
highly and believe that it should always be given deference unless it is clear
that Congress intended otherwise, a rather high bar to meet.202  As a result,
the Second and Eight Circuits have held that the FAA overrides a plaintiff’s
ability to bring collective FLSA claims, while the Fifth Circuit has held that
the FAA overrides a plaintiff’s ability to exercise his rights under the
NLRA.203
Furthermore, all the circuits seem to be in agreement that the main
debate is over the right to group action as opposed to individual action, not
the right to litigation as opposed to arbitration.  For example, the Seventh
Circuit in Lewis found the waiver to be invalid not because it prevented
employees from litigating claims in court, but because it infringed on their
right to bring claims as a group through “concerted action.”204  Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit in Morris found that it was the fact that the waiver prevented
employees from bringing claims as a group that made it unenforceable
under the NLRA.205  The Second Circuit in Sutherland also made clear that it
was approaching the issue from the individual-group perspective in rejecting
the effective vindication doctrine—the concept that some claims can only be
effectively vindicated when brought as a group action.206  In the same way,
the Fifth Circuit in Horton indicated that it was basing its holding on the
individual-group distinction by focusing its analysis on the fact that it was the
right to collective procedures—which could be either arbitral or judicial—that
was preempted by the FAA.207  Finally, the Eighth Circuit in Owen based its
holding in large part on its conclusion that it was not bound to obey the
NLRB’s pronouncement that employees have a right to concerted action
under the NLRA—a clear sign that it viewed the issue as an individual-group
one.208
Closely related to the individual-group dichotomy is the relative weight
the circuits grant to the FAA and NLRA.  Unsurprisingly, the circuits that
consider the NLRA to be compatible with or trump the FAA have also found
the NLRA’s right to concerted activity to be dispositive, while the circuits that
consider the FAA to trump the NLRA have found the FAA’s emphasis on
enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms to be dispositive.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit in Lewis held that an employer cannot force an
employee to waive his right to concerted activity (i.e., collective action) since
201 See Morris, 834 F.3d at 983, 986–89.
202 See Horton, 737 F.3d at 360–61; Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 295–96; Owen, 702 F.3d at
1052.
203 See supra Section III.B.
204 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1161.
205 Morris, 834 F.3d at 986.
206 See Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 298.
207 See Horton, 737 F.3d at 359–60.
208 See Owen, 702 F.3d at 1053–54.
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the FAA’s saving clause prevents the FAA from clashing with the NLRA caus-
ing the NLRA to govern.209  In a similar way the Ninth Circuit in Morris held
that employees are entitled to bring collective actions because the substantive
right to concerted activity in the NLRA trumps the FAA’s directive that arbi-
tration agreements be enforced according to their terms.210  Conversely, the
Second Circuit in Sutherland emphasized the fact that it was not bound to
follow the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA and that consequently the
waiver agreement should be enforced in accord with the FAA’s mandate.211
The Fifth Circuit in Horton came to the same conclusion, directly rejecting
the NLRB’s interpretation and finding that the FAA trumps what it consid-
ered to be a procedural right to concerted activity.212  Finally, in keeping
with this pattern the Eighth Circuit in Owen held that the NLRA was sub-
servient to the FAA since Congress had not indicated otherwise and that the
FAA conclusively decided the outcome of the case.213
Given these differing approaches, it is unsurprising that the current state
of the law is muddled.  Each court’s policy decision to read the FAA broadly
or (relatively) narrowly, and to accord dispositive or dismissive weight to the
NLRA, has a tremendous impact on the outcome an employer should expect
to see when it moves to compel individual arbitration on the basis of a con-
tract with its employees.  Consequently, until the Supreme Court definitively
decides the issue, the legality of class action waivers in employment contracts
will remain dependent on the court in which a lawsuit is brought.
B. Class Action Waivers Should Be Unenforceable
Now that the Court has agreed to resolve the circuit split,214 it will be
forced to make the aforementioned policy choices for itself.  Despite the
Court’s trend of reading the FAA expansively, nothing in the Court’s recent
jurisprudence mandates that its hands are bound when it comes to class
action waivers in the employment context.  Not only can the Court reverse
this trend, the Court should reverse this trend and make class action waivers
in the employment context unenforceable for the following reasons.  First,
the agency explicitly tasked with managing employer-employee relations, the
NLRB, has interpreted the NLRA to prohibit such waivers.  Second, sound
policy suggests that the benefits of enforcing these waivers are outweighed by
the costs of doing so.
The Court’s recent precedent, although somewhat concerning, can be
distinguished on the basis of the difference between merchant-consumer
contracts and employer-employee contracts.  For example, in Concepcion the
209 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157–58.
210 Morris, 834 F.3d at 985–87.
211 Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 295, 297 n.8.
212 Horton, 737 F.3d at 357.
213 Owen, 702 F.3d at 1052, 1054.
214 On January 13, 2017, the Court consolidated Lewis, Morris, and Murphy Oil and
granted cert.  823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 2017 WL 125664
(U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (mem.).
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contract at issue was between a telephone provider (a merchant) and its cus-
tomers (consumers).215  Likewise, the contract at issue in Italian Colors
involved a credit card company (a merchant) and merchants interested in
accepting the cards offered by that company (consumers in this context inso-
far as they “consumed” American Express’s “good”).216  Finally, the contract
at issue in DIRECTV involved a cable television provider (a merchant) and its
customers (consumers).217  In contrast, all of the circuit court cases
examined in Part III involved contracts between employers and their
employees.218
This distinction is important for a couple of reasons.  First, the NLRB is
tasked with governing relations between employers and employees, not
merchants and consumers.219  Consequently, the federal statute that gives
employees the right to engage in concerted activity—the NLRA—likewise
only gives this right to employees in the context of their relationship with
their employers, not as consumers generally.220  This means that the Court
has an additional tool it can use to find class action waivers unenforceable in
the employment context that it could not use in the merchant-consumer
context.
Moreover, the right to a class action is more critical in the employment
context insofar as it is easier for a consumer to switch merchants if he does
not want to be bound by the mandatory arbitration agreement offered to him
than it is for an employee to find another job if his current one is forcing him
to sign such an agreement.221  This argument is somewhat of a double-edged
sword, however, given the reality of existing market conditions.  Although
consumers can technically choose a different provider of goods or services if
they do not like the contract being offered to them, in reality, they will
almost certainly be required to sign such a waiver regardless of where they go
since they are virtually universal in the consumer context.222  It follows that if
mandatory class action waivers can be enforced in a context where doing so
effectively eliminates the ability to bring class actions (the consumer context)
215 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 333 (2011).
216 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013).  Even if the
merchant-consumer relationship is tenuous in this case, a company-company relationship
would be equally distinguishable from the employer-employee relationship.
217 DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015).
218 See supra Part III.
219 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–53, 156, 160 (2012).
220 See supra subsection I.A.2.
221 Which would you rather do: quit your job and hope to find a new one or switch
phones from Verizon to T-Mobile or insurance from State Farm to Geico?
222 For example, a 2015 study of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
found that over 92% of contracts for prepaid cards and over 86% of student loan contracts
included mandatory arbitration clauses. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 16.  Even
more crucially, the same study found that over 90% of these mandatory arbitration agree-
ments expressly prohibited class actions. See id.
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they should also be enforced in a context where the ability to avoid such
waivers remains viable (the employee context).223
It could also be argued that even if the Court’s recent precedent does
not bind it, its decisions in Gilmer and Adams do.  Unlike most of the other
Supreme Court cases that have touched on mandatory arbitration agree-
ments, Gilmer at least tangentially involved an employer-employee relation-
ship.224  Nonetheless, Gilmer can be distinguished from true mandatory
waiver clauses in the employment context insofar as the arbitration agree-
ment in the case was a securities registration application, not an employment
contract.225 Adams, on the other hand, involves a true employer-employee
relationship.226  It too can be distinguished on multiple grounds, however.
First, as Section IV.A established, the real debate when it comes to these
waiver clauses is over the individual-group distinction.  Yet Adams only
involved a waiver of the plaintiff’s right to litigation, not his right to group
action.227  In addition, Adams merely stands for the proposition that the
FAA’s exemption clause applies solely to transportation workers—rather
than all employees—not that the FAA automatically necessitates enforcement
of class action waivers.228  Thus, it is clear that the Court is not required to
find class action waivers in the employment context enforceable on account
of its prior precedent.
Not only is the Court not required to enforce class action waivers, the
Court should not enforce such waivers.  The federal law of the NLRA, as
understood by the agency responsible for interpreting it, is explicitly clear on
the issue.  For example, the NLRB in D.R. Horton explained how “[t]he
Board has long held . . . that the NLRA protects employees’ ability to join
together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation,” and
that “an individual who files a class or collective action regarding wages,
hours or working conditions, whether in court or before an arbitrator . . . is
engaged in conduct protected by [the NLRA].”229  It follows that the right to
engage in concerted activity under the NLRA—whether it be class litigation
or class arbitration—should be given the deference it deserves: that of a sub-
stantive federally guaranteed right.230  As such, it should easily fall within the
FAA’s saving clause, which only makes arbitration clauses enforceable when
they do not impinge on a ground that exists for the revocation of a contract;
223 Incidentally, one of the best illustrations of the dangers of the ubiquity in the con-
sumer context and one of the most compelling arguments for overruling Concepcion and
making class action waivers unenforceable in that context is the ongoing Wells Fargo
fiasco. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asks Court to Force Customers to Arbitration in Fake Accounts Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/wells-fargo-
asks-court-to-force-customers-to-arbitration-in-fake-accounts-cases.html.
224 See supra Section I.B.
225 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991).
226 See supra Section I.B.
227 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110 (2001).
228 See id. at 109.
229 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2278–79 (2012).
230 See id. at 2280.
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the infringement of a substantive right is such a ground.231  Moreover, the
NLRA is more applicable to the employment context than the FAA and thus
should be given more weight if they do come into conflict in that context.
Unlike the FAA, which is, by its language, tailored towards arbitration agree-
ments in commerce generally, the NLRA is specifically addressed to the
employment context.232  In addition, the NLRA is administered by an agency
that by definition focuses on labor law, while the FAA is not.233  Given these
facts, the Supreme Court should follow the lead of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits and favor the NLRA over the FAA when it comes to class action waiv-
ers in the employment context.
Finally, sound policy also dictates that class action waivers in employ-
ment contracts should be unenforceable.  As a lauded New York Times investi-
gatory series has pointed out, forced individual arbitration in the
employment context makes it less likely that discriminatory employment
practices will be eliminated, as employees do not know what is happening to
their fellow employees.234  Court records also show that “[b]y banning class
actions, companies have essentially disabled consumer challenges to prac-
tices like predatory lending, wage theft and discrimination.”235  One likely
cause is the fact that the ability of employees to effectively vindicate their
rights is often impeded when they are unable to bring their claims as a
group.236  This suggests that the Court should not extend its rejection of the
effective vindication doctrine in Italian Colors to the employment context.  In
addition, although Concepcion and its progeny have not yet signaled the
much-feared death of the class action,237 a Court decision that extends the
231 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir.
2016).
232 Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
. . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . . . .”), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in other concerted
activities . . . .”).
233 The very name of that organization, the National Labor Relations Board, indicates
this fact. See 29 U.S.C. § 153; see also supra subsection I.A.2.
234 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html.  An examination of the
facts in Lewis also illustrates this problem; if Jacob Lewis had been undisputedly forced into
individual arbitration, it is likely that many of his fellow employees would not have realized
that they too were potentially being deprived of overtime pay. See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151;
see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995) (“The
disclosure through litigation of incidents or practices that violate national policies respect-
ing nondiscrimination in the work force is itself important, for the occurrence of violations
may disclose patterns of noncompliance . . . .”).
235 Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 234.
236 See id. (“[I]t is nearly impossible for one individual to take on a corporation with
vast resources.”).
237 Compare Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U.
KAN. L. REV. 767, 767 (2012) (“In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court
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FAA to the employment context would threaten to do so.  At that point it is
hard to imagine what would prevent companies from instituting class action
waivers in all facets of their business, both internal and external.238  This
would have the unsavory effect of solidifying the aforementioned problems,
such as the fact that “class actions have been the only way through which
workers have been able to significantly address wage violations occurring
across industries.”239  Thus, it is clear that the risks of enforcing class action
waivers in the employment context are great.
Moreover, the main benefit of holding such waivers to be unenforce-
able—that courts will be able to avoid an enormous proliferation of class
action lawsuits—is not nearly as substantive as it appears to be.  Just because
employees are able to pursue their claims through group actions does not
mean that those actions have to be brought through litigation.  They could
just as easily be brought through class arbitration, avoiding the clogging-the-
courts problem altogether.  It is also not clear that employees are currently
rushing to file class actions—despite the fact that they are able to do so.240
Not all employees view arbitration as a negative forum, as it does confer cer-
tain benefits such as privacy, speed, ease of access, and low upfront cost, and
it is likely that many would rather participate in individual arbitration than a
class action.241  In addition, there is the possibility that if companies know
that they can be held accountable by their employees through the use of
group action, they will be less likely to abuse their employees in the first
place.  This, in turn, would lead to fewer class action suits in the long run.
Perhaps most importantly, the ultimate goal of the federal court system is to
ensure that aggrieved parties attain justice, not to create a well-oiled machine
for doing so.242
potentially allowed for the evisceration of class arbitration, and indeed most class actions,
in consumer and employment settings where contracts contain a pre-dispute arbitration
provision . . . .”), with Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 154 (2014) (“[I]n several respects, the impact of Concepcion has
been overstated.”).
238 The benefits these agreements provide to employers greatly outweigh their costs,
and it is clear that the trend among companies is already towards including such agree-
ments. See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 4 (“[T]oday it is common for employees
to be presented with terms of employment that include both a clause that obligates them
to arbitrate all disputes . . . and one that prohibits them from pursuing their claims in a
class or collective action.”).
239 Nicole Wredberg, Note, Subverting Workers’ Rights: Class Action Waivers and the Arbitral
Threat to the NLRA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 888 (2016).
240 See, e.g., Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson & Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or
Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United
States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 194–95 (2010) (finding that “[e]mployment dis-
crimination litigation is a system dominated by individual cases” and that “[l]ess than 1
[employment discrimination] case in 10 has any element of collective action”).
241 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 3, at 3.
242 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTRODUCTION FOR JUDGES AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATORS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
8–9 (3d ed. 2010) (“The federal courts often are called the guardians of the Constitution
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Finally, the Court should take account of Congress’s renewed interest in
the matter.  Although the Arbitration Fairness Act is currently stalled in both
the House and the Senate, it is clear that its support in Congress is not insig-
nificant.243  Moreover, the outcry over the recent Wells Fargo scandal could
force Congress’s hand.244  The ramifications of the bill, if passed, would be
enormous.  In its most recent form the bill proposes to add a section to Title
9 of the United States Code which would state that “no predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an
employment dispute, consumer dispute, antirust dispute, or civil rights dis-
pute.”245  This would effectively reverse Concepcion and strike down
mandatory class action waivers in both the employment and consumer con-
text.  Even in the absence of the bill’s passage, class action waivers in employ-
ment contracts should be unenforceable as the Court’s current precedent
does not foreclose the possibility, and sound policy and the NLRA advocate
for this position.
CONCLUSION
For now, uncertainty remains when it comes to the legality of class action
waivers in employment contracts.  Although the Supreme Court has consid-
ered the issue, at least tangentially, and multiple circuits have taken their
shot at resolving the issue, no concrete conclusion can be reached.246  On
the one side stand the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have held these
types of waivers to be unenforceable.  On the other side stand the Second,
Fifth, and Eight Circuits which have held the exact same types of waivers to
be enforceable.  Now that the Court has chosen to intervene, it should take
seriously the concept that the power of the FAA is not limitless, despite the
Court’s recent trend of construing it expansively.  The agency most in tune
with the labor needs of the country has spoken and interpreted an equally
valid (and potentially more relevant) federal law, the NLRA, to guarantee
employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity—including collective
because their rulings protect the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
Through fair and impartial judgments, they determine facts and interpret the law to
resolve legal disputes. . . . The framers of the Constitution considered an independent
federal judiciary essential to ensure fairness and equal justice to all citizens . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
243 See, e.g., Letter from Henry C. “Hank” Johnson, Jr., Ranking Member, House Sub-
comm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law & John Conyers, Jr., Ranking
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, House Comm. on
the Judiciary (Nov. 16, 2015) (on file with author).
244 See, e.g., Aaron Jordan, Why the Wells Fargo Scandal Shows the Need to End Forced Arbitra-
tion, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.afj.org/blog/why-the-wells-fargo-
scandal-shows-the-need-to-end-forced-arbitration; see also Wells Fargo Asks Court to Force Cus-
tomers to Arbitration in Fake Accounts Cases, supra note 223.
245 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. § 402; see also Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. § 402.
246 See supra Part IV.
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actions—in pursuit of their workplace interests.247  Even if the NLRA does
not trump the FAA, it is not clear that the two statutes are in conflict when
the FAA’s savings clause is taken into account.  Moreover, sound policy sug-
gests that the benefits of enforcing these waivers are outweighed by the risks
of doing so.248  Thus, the unbridled enlargement of the FAA should stop at
employment contracts, and mandatory class action waivers in these contracts
should be found unenforceable.  The eyes of countless companies and their
employees now turn to the Court.
247 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012), enforced in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013); see also supra subsection
I.A.2.
248 See supra Section IV.B.
